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Policy, citizenship and governance: the 




Current discussions regarding the relationship between welfare governance systems 
and employment-promotion in disability policy appeal to a rejuvenated neo-liberal 
and paternalistic understanding of welfare governance. At the core of this rationality 
is the argument that people with disabilities have not only rights, but also duties, in 
relation to the State. In the Australia welfare system, policy tools are deployed to 
produce a form of self-discipline, whereby the State emphasises personal 
responsibility via assessment tools, ‘mutual obligation’ policy, and motivational 
strategies. Drawing on a two-year semi-longitudinal study with 80 people with a 
disability accessing welfare benefits, we examine how welfare governance subject 
recipients to strategies to produce productive citizens who are able to contribute to the 
national goal of maintaining competitiveness in the global economy. Participants’ 
interviews reveal the intended and unintended effects of this activation policy, 
including some acceptance of the logic of welfare-to-work and counter-hegemonic 
resistance to de-valued social identities.  
Points of Interest 
 This article is based on research with 80 people with disabilities in Australia currently 
accessing either the Disability Support Pension (DSP) or Newstart (the 
unemployment benefit).  
 The research explores their experiences in accessing paid employment following the 
implementation of the radical ‘welfare-to-work’ policy reforms in 2006. 
 These reforms attempted to move people on Disability Support Pensions (DSP) onto a 
lower income support payment that require stringent activation assessments and 
sanctions for non-compliance. 
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 The research is reveals the limitations of these policy reforms and how people with a 
disability are responding to new modes of governing citizenship rights and 
responsibilities.  
Introduction 
Over the past decade, there has been considerable reform to the welfare system in 
Australia. Similar to other Anglophone countries, an income support system with 
minimal obligations on the unemployed has given way to a system deeply entwined 
with the market-centred philosophy of neo-liberalism and the paternalism of social 
conservatism (Schram et al. 2010). This system of governance is unequivocally 
focused on moving income support recipients from ‘welfare-to-work’ through 
government sanctioned job search training. For people with a disability of workforce 
age, the shift can be understood in conceptual terms as a change from being 
represented as ‘deserving’ of government support, to now being included in the ever 
expanding category of ‘never-deserving citizen’ whose worth is validated only 
through labor market participation. In this article we trace the rationale of this policy 
shift and explore the impact on the identities of people with a disability and 
implications for social citizenship. We are interested in how deserving subjects of 
policy are problematised and reconstructed through activation policy as ‘worker-
citizens’ – where social value is measured primarily in terms of labor market 
association.  
We draw on research from a two year Australian Research Council funded project 
(2007-2009) that examined the experiences of people with a disability, their 
interactions with Disability Employment Services, and their attempts to access paid 
labour post implementation of the radical ‘welfare-to-work’ reforms in 2006. The 
reforms were an attempt to move people on Disability Support Pensions (DSP), who 
were previously spared coercive unemployed policies, onto a lower income support 
payment that are subject to labour market activity assessments and sanctions for non-
compliance. Our interviews illuminate the tensions and limitations of the reforms, 
highlighting how welfare governance operationalises practices which discipline 
welfare recipients and cultivate forms of self-regulation. In tracing responses to this 
policy change at an individual and collective level, this paper also makes a 
contribution to the largely under-theorized Australian disability movement (Soldatic 
and Chapman, 2010). 
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In examining the intended and unintended effects of this policy change process we 
begin by outlining the backdrop of welfare-to-work policies in Australia, including a 
discussion of recent welfare reforms in the context of ‘activation’. We then explore 
participant’s personal experiences of the welfare-to-work changes, which allow us to 
consider how they speak back to dominant discourses underpinning activation 
policies. Here we take our analytical cue from Clarke (2006) who uses post-structural 
accounts of the subject to argue for a richer understanding of change and contestation 
than is evident in some post-Foucauldian scholarship on welfare citizenship. Clarke 
(2006: 97) argues, ‘Subjection is too often treated as a presumed effect in many of 
these analyses, rather than being treated as a problematic ambition which may or may 
not be achieved in practice’.  Here Clarke makes a call to researchers to consider the 
extent to which these citizenship projects are actually ‘successful’. To this end we 
examine the tools of assessments, reporting practices and managerial systems that 
screen and investigate welfare recipients, and how participants speak back to 
dominant subject positions, such as the one-dimensional worker-citizen. 
Governing welfare in the age of ‘activation’  
Workfare is a domestic social project of neoliberal global restructuring and promoted 
through global policy institutions including the OECD and the IMF. The general 
thrust of workfare represents a change from efforts to ameliorate the inequalities of 
capitalism and shield citizens from market pressures, toward policy that actively 
maximize integration into the global economy and an ‘acceptance of the marketplace’ 
(Mead 1989: 87). In this policy frame, the neoliberal workfare project takes an active 
stance, emphasizing the need to instil specific competencies and the adoption of 
productivist ideologies in order to assimilate into market relations (See Bessant et al, 
2006: 106-07). The restructuring of social welfare programs have been redesigned to 
be ‘active’ in instilling market values and enacting strategies to move individuals 
from welfare to work (OEDC, 2009). 
Another dimension of the neo-liberalism welfare project is the shifting meaning and 
practice of citizenship. The social citizen has undergone a shift since the post-war 
period from one who decides and acts collectively with others to gain preferred policy 
outcomes, to one reduced to the individualistic market role of consumer, worker, and 
paying customer . As Schram et al. (2010: 743) notes, ‘Citizens…are now 
synonymous with ‘taxpayers’ who have a contractual right to expect efficient and 
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effective institutional actions that produce a good return on their investment’. 
Citizenship is then associated pre-eminently with being an economic agent. The 
assumption is that paid employment is privileged over other forms of economic and 
social activity (Barnes & Mercer, 2010). As a consequence, other ethical values, such 
as care and justice are further marginalised in their importance as markers of social 
citizenship. Productivity, performance and a willingness to be flexible in regard to 
type of work and associated conditions have become the preferred personal 
orientation of contemporary capitalism (Sennett, 2007). The OECD (2009) ranking 
system has been a particularly influential tool in motivating national governments to 
take these reforms seriously. As Daguerre and Etherington (2009: 3) note, ‘First, they 
make receipt of benefits conditional on the benefit recipient demonstrating active job 
search and/or willingness to take steps to improve employability. Second, they 
provide a range of pre-employment services and advice to help the individuals in 
question find work or get ready to work’. The intent is not to increase the number of 
available jobs, but rather to get individuals ‘job ready’ and implement labour market 
programs. Current welfare programs in Australia are embedded in this trans-national 
understanding of ‘active citizenship’, with civic responsibilities being collapsed into 
the obligation to work.  Goodin (2002) suggests that Australia has one of the most 
articulated workfare policy in the Western world; whereby citizens ‘rights and 
entitlements’ have been redefined as ‘responsibilities and obligations’ (pg. 579).  
The Australian context: pensions, population and policies  
The Australian Government’s legislative amendments in the 2006 Federal Budget to 
disability entitlements fully articulated the neoliberal reimagining of welfare as 
workfare.  In their analysis of the changes, Soldatic and Pini (2009: 88) argue that 
disability ‘was clearly marked out as a site of moral contagion’. OECD figures were 
cited as evidence for these changes highlighting that Australia has one of the largest 
populations of people with a disability who are not in the labour market, and 
increasing numbers of people accessing income support  (OECD 2009). In 2009 there 
were around 800,000 people receiving the Disability Support Pension at a cost of 
around $8.5 billion per year (FaHCSIA 2009). It is estimated that from June 2007 to 
June 2010, the number of DSP recipients grew by almost 11%. Part of this increase 
can be explained by changes in eligibility for the Aged Pension in Australia, which 
forced people to remain on the DSP for a longer period before being transferred to the 
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Aged Pension. Nonetheless, this increase in the overall rate was still considered 
significant, particularly since a key assumption of welfare-to-work policy changes in 
Australia has been that the numbers of people on the DSP would decrease as they 
moved into paid work as a result of ‘activation policies’. In a 2009 speech the Federal 
Minister for Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs acknowledged the 
failure of welfare-to-work policies in shifting people into the workforce: 
‘Unfortunately the disability support pension has become a destination payment… 
clearly the policy challenge we face is to determine why existing policies are failing 
Australians with disability’ (Macklin 2009).  
The OECD’s recommendations over the past decade has been to target and regulate 
new recipients, address the rules of eligibility to benefits whereby governments are 
encouraged to enforce ‘work availability’ requirements for receiving benefits, and 
implement sanctions for non-compliance. For persons who are already in receipt of 
disability-related benefits, the OECD recommends more frequent reassessing of work 
capacity. To this end, the governing of welfare in Australia has become highly 
conditional and contingent on the fulfillment of obligations and the pursuit of 
employment. Invariably, the policy paradigm emphasizes individual responsibility, 
and enacts punitive responses to control those people who are perceived as failing to 
contribute economically. Terms such as ‘independence’, ‘access’ and participation’ 
which have been pivotal to the disability rights agenda were incorporated into the 
2006 welfare-to-work reforms and used to sell welfare reform to the Australian 
public. But as Galvin (2004: 346) points out, ‘a deeper investigation of the ways in 
which these words are being used reveals that, unlike their emancipatory application 
which draws from notions of equality and social justice, their reappropriation by the 
Australian Government has required their reformulation into neoliberal forms, steeped 
in individualization and economic rationalism’.  
Since July 1st 2006, any person applying for the Disability Pension assessed as 
having a partial capacity to work between 15 and 29 hours per week were placed on 
Newstart Allowance or Youth Allowance. The previous work assessment was set at 
being able to work 30 hours per week. At the time of implementation various peak 
welfare bodies warned the federal government that people with a disability could be 
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up to $120 a week worse off as they moved from the DSP to Newstart1 Allowance 
(NATSEM  2005).  
While the welfare change were considered to be a radical policy measure by many 
social advocacy groups, it is perhaps more accurate to see these changes as a 
continuum of previous incremental changes to disability employment policy in 
Australia. Argyrous and Neale (2003) note that successive Australian governments 
over the past 30 years have failed to reduce the number of disability support 
pensioners by simply tightening the eligibility criteria where there has not been a 
simultaneous increase in available jobs. Cai and Gregory (2004) found that an 
increase in the rate of unemployment is accompanied by increases in people applying 
for pensions. Part of this demand-side failure also relates to what Goggin and Newell 
(2005) describe as the disability apartheid, where the State does not accommodate for 
impairment thus disabling the individual. Although people with disability often face 
personal challenges living with their disability, societal and workplace attitudes are 
often negative and employer activity is typically minimal (Galvin, 2005).  
It is important to note that the Disability Employment Network (DEN) which have 
assisted people with disability for over 30 years in making transitions to open 
employment have also been subject to market reforms. The welfare-to-work reforms 
fundamentally changed the way in which the DEN organisations work with their 
clients, moving from a form of voluntary assistance to a mode of engagement with 
clients based on compulsion and coercion. DEN workers are now required to not only 
assist people to find suitable employment but also take on a policing and compliance 
role. One of the contractual duties of case management is monitoring the conduct of 
clients to ensure they comply with their activity agreements (Soldatic & Pini, 2009). 
These dual roles present ethical challenges for workers in that they must make 
determinations which cast them as either an agent of the state (monitoring and 
compliance) or an agent for the client (advocacy and support) (Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno, 2000). These ethical tensions are not easily reconciled in practice 
(Thornton & Marston 2008). Rather than investigate the intended and unintended 
affects for front-line workers our intention in this paper is to explore the perspectives 
of ‘clients’ subject to the reforms. The following section outlines how the Australian 
                                                 
1 Allowances, such as the unemployment benefit (Newstart Allowance) are paid at a lower rate than 
pensions in Australia. This discrepancy is partly an historical artifact because it was thought that 
unemployment would always be a temporary phenomena.  
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Research Council study was conducted, before moving onto the analysis and 
discussion.  
Methods and purpose of the study 
The research discussed in this paper is based on empirical data obtained through 
qualitative interviews of 80 people with disabilities in receipt of either the Disability 
Support Pension (DSP) or who had been transferred to Newstart spanning the period 
from 2008 to 2009. The purpose of this study was to better understand the experiences 
of people with a disability in their attempts to access the paid labour market post 
implementation of the 2006 welfare-to-work reforms. Many studies have examined 
ways to increase labour market integration of people with disabilities and include 
recommendations for job monitoring in work environments (Roulstone  & Warren 
2005); affirmative action (Raskin 1994); job coaching (Hoekstra et al. 2004); social 
capital development to build social networks to overcome employment difficulties 
(Potts 2005); and customised employment (Griffin & Keeton 2009). But many of 
these policy prescriptions often miss the actual lived experiences of people with a 
disability accessing welfare benefits, nor do they question some of the assumptions 
inherent in the welfare reforms.  
Research participants were recruited primarily through a number of DEN’s (now 
changed to DES - Disability Employment Services) providing research flyers to their 
clients. Participants came from both urban and rural areas across Australia and 
identified with having a range of disabilities including physical and intellectual 
disabilities, psychiatric and psychological conditions, behavioural disorders, autism 
and acquired brain injury. We sought to include responses from people living with a 
range of different impairments. Our numbers are too small to say anything definitive 
about how different forms of disability and ability affect perceptions and responses; 
however we recognize that in using a more general category of disability we risk 
minimizing the effect that intersected identities have on experience and attitudes. To 
help minimalise this risk we have also included gender, age and ethnicity where we 
have that information in introducing quotes. In terms of the socio-economic position 
of research participants, were either on the Disability Pension or unemployment 
benefit (Newstart allowance) and were therefore located at the bottom of the 
household income scale.  The Australian Bureau of Statistics 2009-10 Household 
Expenditure Survey on indicators of financial stress, shows that in the previous 12 
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months almost one in four people (78.7%) on Newstart Allowance reported three or 
more indicators of financial stress.  This means that 27% sought financial help from 
family or friends; 46% were only able to afford second hand clothes most of the time, 
or 14% of unemployed people sought assistance from a welfare or community 
organization (ABS, 2010). 
The first round of face-to-face semi-structured interviews traced participant’s life 
histories - current and past employment, housing, quality of their relationships with 
family and welfare workers, the factors inhibiting their participation in work or 
finding work, experience of the job-capacity assessment process, and their aspirations 
for the future. The second round of interviews, another 12 months later, focused on 
any changes in circumstances. The timing of these two interviews allowed sufficient 
time to examine the impact of the policy changes after 12 months of implementation.  
Operationalising welfare to work - Job Capacity Assessment 
In her critique of neo-liberalism governance of welfare in the 21st century, Dowse 
(2009) argues that such a system brings a culture which seeks to identify those who 
are deemed unlikely, unable, or in need of assistance to attain working ‘productive’ 
status (Dowse 2009, 576). The Job Capacity Assessment (JCA) is one such strategy, 
introduced on July 1st 2006, to establish recipient’s capacity to work. If the Job 
Capacity Assessor concludes that an individual is able to work at least 15 hours a 
week, they are placed on the unemployment benefit, Newstart Allowance, and agree 
to sign an Activity Agreement which outlines their contractual obligations and 
possible sanctions if they fail to comply.  
While most participants believe the government has a right to assess their 
circumstances, many challenge both the assessment process itself and the assumptions 
that underlie the assessments. Paul, a 38 year-old Brisbane resident with HIV, speaks 
for many when he boldly questions the assumptions of the JCA assessment: 
‘They [Government] assume that the person getting a disability pension isn’t truthful 
about what has happened in their life. They assume that the person is using the system 
to do whatever they want. For example, they still make me bring in medical 
certificates even though I have the later stages of HIV. Hasn’t anyone told them that 
there is no cure!’ 
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The JCA process attempts to distinguish weather an individual’s disability is based in 
choice or chance (bad luck, accident etc.) and attaches benefits or burden based on 
this assessment. This gives the Federal Government a way of rationalising 
compensation and deciding who gets what assistance. Moss and Marston (2009: 6) 
argue that the welfare system assumes that ‘an individual should bear the risks of 
misfortune if it is decided that their disadvantage is likely to come from his or her 
own choices’. They note that the unemployed bear a higher risk than other groups in 
the community, highlighting for instance, farmers, who are able to receive drought 
assistance even when their framing practices may be unsustainable, through their own 
bad choices. ‘If a farmer plants crops that are not suitable to local conditions or 
neglects to drought proof their land, then the assistance will still be available’ (Moss 
& Marston 2009: 7). Feather’s (2006) work on the psychology of distributional justice 
illustrates the tying effects of normative conceptions of deserving, which is 
conceptualized through notions of achievements, whereby individuals are evaluated 
according to hierarchy of ‘deservedness’.  The role of this moral reframing is that the 
position of inequity becomes internal to the individual, and responsibility for the 
individuals social outcomes is thus borne by the poor, the disadvantaged, and those 
marked as other (See Soldatic & Pini, 2009).  
Participants also questioned the actual JCA process, suggesting that the process is a 
return to ‘disability’ as a site of abjection and medicalisation - constructions that the 
global disability movement have actively reframed and moved towards disability as a 
site of social oppression and politics (Goggin & Newell, 2005). The disability rights 
movement in Australia have always demanded equality in accessing social goods and 
services, and have been successful in enshrining social justice principles in anti-
discrimination legislation. However, legal redress is only part of the solution. 
Meekosha (2001) argues that equal treatment and equal opportunity remains the 
greatest challenge to an able-bodied society that has difficulties in reframing 
democratic participation that is truly inclusive.  
27 year-old Madeline, diagnosed as legally blind during high school, points to the 
way in which people are rendered mere spectators when defining their needs:  
 ‘Everyday life decisions are vested in the hands of people who have very little 
understanding of the everyday reality of disabled people's lives. They may understand 
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the physical or psychological illness, but this doesn’t mean they know about our 
working lives and how much we are able to work’. 
Ralph a 34-year old man from Brisbane explains further: 
 ‘She was an OT (Occupational Therapist) that did the assessment. I thought, ‘what 
do you know about my mental health?... I don’t think it was fair that she did my 
assessment. Don’t get me wrong, she’s probably an excellent OT, but I don’t need an 
OT’.  
And reiterated by Demi, a 52-year-old woman from Albany with an intellectual 
disability:  
‘I remember handing over my medical certificates to the assessor and thinking, “how 
are you going read these. You’re not a doctor”.  And then thinking, “why would a 
doctor be assessing me anyway. Shouldn’t that be up to me and my employer and 
maybe my support worker”’.  
Participant’s comments reveal that the assessment is a structure used to reinforce the 
construction of disability with being sick (Oliver 1998:1447), highlighting the 
continual struggle to confront dominant representations of disability and assumptions 
about ‘normality’ (Meekosha, 2001)  
Participants also experienced a sense of insecurity by being continually assessed. The 
possible loss of income and benefits with changes to DSP was strongly felt. 35 year-
old Brisbane resident Leonard who lives with an acquired brain injury explains: 
‘It’s a fear that they will say “You’re capable of working 25 hours a week” without 
considering the lack of supports I have and that my disability isn’t constant. I don’t 
think entering into this assessment puts me in a safe place. I may be worse off’. 
Bernard is a 31 year-old man from Brisbane living with a spinal injury. He has higher 
education qualifications, works full-time, and has strong opinions about the workfare 
reforms and the insecurities they can bring.  His opinions are widely shared by 
research participants:  
 ‘They [Government] place value on things that may not I value. Then they exercise 
control over you. Like they say “here’s some money, come and take it and there’s 
more coming next week, but I’m not telling you when it’s going to stop coming”. Then 
they change the rules and the money stops or there is a threat of it not coming…and 
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then they expect us to justify why we need the money again and again and expect that 
we’re just going to do it without any thought. It’s relentless assessments and 
surveillance’. 
Bernard’s comments shed light on the processes and practices designed to shape 
compliance with neo-liberalism. Jolly (2003) argues that this surveillance contributes 
to the ontological ambiguity of impairment by ignoring the disabling aspects and 
barriers that prevent people with disabilities from achieving their goals. Like many in 
this study, 33 year-old Jacinta discussed how this process affects her ability to access 
and maintain a continuity of care with her DEN service:  
 ‘I hate how they’ve told me “you can only be with one employment agency for 18 
months…and then we have to shift you on to somewhere else”. I was with one 
disability agency for eight years and they were great, and then they gave me the 
“heave ho” because everyone was like “I don’t think you’re ever going to get a job, 
and you’ve been on the books for too long”’. 
For Madeline, the quality of relationships she has with her employment consultants 
has significantly changed with these reforms:  
‘…when I was just out of school I didn’t always have allocated times to see my job 
person. It was like “lets have a coffee and talk about your life how we can support 
you.”  And even though it was an employment agency, we didn’t always have to focus 
on employment if that wasn’t the main thing.  Since the introduction of case based 
funding they now have to account for every single hour I’m with them. They also have 
a finite period of time to have you in a job and if the money runs out before you’re in 
a job - oh well, tough to you.’ 
Madeline’s comments shed light on the new technologies of welfare policies which 
are economically driven towards investing in the individual pursuit of independence, 
framing inclusion in terms of productivity and contribution, rather than self-fulfillment 
or quality of life. Galvin (2004) reminds us that the concept of disability as we know it 
‘only came into being when the industrial revolution necessitated that workers fit the 
mold stamped out by mechanization and the time table, a reality which served to 
exclude those whose physical differences made it impossible for them to ‘work’ in 
this newly regimented, uniform fashion’ (pg 345).  Further, Galvin (2004: 345) argues 
that ‘welfare reforms intend to remove only the protective classification of ‘disability’ 
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in an attempt to make disabled people, as a welfare category, disappear without doing 
much, if anything, to remedy the actual conditions of exclusion that this term 
represents’. The shift from a social needs based system of state resource allocation to 
a work based mode of distribution has implications for how people construct their 
own sense of rights and responsibilities, as the next section highlights.  
The ‘self-productive individual’ 
For most participants, the personal responsibility for gaining employment is strongly 
felt. When asked by researchers, ‘Whose responsibility do you think it is to find paid 
employment?’ participants said, ‘I do’(Krystal), ‘It’s up to me (Melinda), ‘Definitely 
me’, (Patrick), ‘It’s my responsibility’(Janie), ‘It’s on my shoulders’ (Jimmy) 
revealing some acceptance of neo-liberal ideologies where the responsibility for 
achieving individual independence and ‘productive selves’ is their own. These 
responses illustrate how autonomy and economic independence have been collapsed 
by welfare-to-work policies. In this same context most of the participant’s also 
accepted the human capital discourse that underpins activation policies, when they 
spoke of ‘jumping through hoops’(Nelson), the necessity to ‘develop new 
skills’(Jacinta), ‘more knowledge’ (Teresa), ‘higher education’(Gabriel), in order to 
satisfy the performative dimensions of welfare-to-work policies.  
And it is clear that participants work hard on their ‘selves’ to become these self-
sufficient individuals. 37 year-old Jules from Western Australia would like a job. She 
has been in education and training since she was 16 years-old, attained multiple 
TAFE qualifications, but has been looking for work ‘basically non-stop for 14 years'. 
She says:  
‘Yes I’m a little slower because of my intellectual disability, but I want a job so it puts 
all the computer skills and the qualifications I have into practice. While I’m looking 
for work I feel like all my education is being flushed down the toilet…’ . 
Similarly Madeline discusses her search for independence through work: 
 ‘…I was always told that I was under skilled and not work ready. So I have studied 
hard. But when I came back they sent me to more study. This made me feel like I was 
never going to be job ready. That maybe I was too physically disabled to have a job 
and no amount of skills or knowledge was going to be enough’. 
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Despite the pursuit of self-sufficiency, participants all spoke about discrimination and 
obstacles in the workplace which hampered their options and access to paid 
employment.  
The 14 years since being out of high school, Jacinta has done numerous years of 
voluntary work, completed a range of TAFE certificates, yet has less than three 
months of paid employment. The main reasons she says are:  
‘…finding an understanding employer that’s willing to accommodate me even though 
I might need modifications to the workplace. I might get to the first interview but then 
after the interview they write back to me saying “you’ve been unsuccessful on this 
account due to the fact that you don’t have a drivers license”. Well it should have 
been obvious when I turned up to the interview. I am legally blind.  I’ve always seen 
myself as being able to work.  But that hasn’t changed how everyone else’s sees me’. 
Jacinta’s comments highlight the neoliberal logic that weds welfare dependency with 
individual deficiency (especially in regards to skills, motivation and discipline) rather 
than the structural dynamics of competitive labour markets. Research reveals that the 
main barriers for people with disabilities accessing paid employment are connected to 
discrimination, lack of support, lack of available and suitable jobs (See Morris 2005). 
Many participant s in this study also experience logistical barriers to employment – 
access to a motor vehicle license, transport, appropriate and consistent carers, 
operational wheelchairs and any mobility aids. Soldatic and Chapman (2010) note 
that resources that facilitate disabled people’s employment participation are rarely 
acknowledged in workfare debates or with the actual welfare-to-work legislation. 
And the logic becoming a ‘self-sufficient and productive citizen’ means that many 
participants place themselves in unsafe and uncertain situations by not declaring their 
disability to employers. Many attempt to manage their specific circumstances outside 
the workplace including 34 year-old Brett who manages infrequent episodes of 
schizophrenia alone: 
 ‘I prefer where possible not to disclose. I get worried that if I disclose that I am 
paranoid schizophrenic that might be a… not a direct discrimination, but an indirect 
one’.  
Similarly, 34-year old Brisbane resident Darren works hard to maintain employment, 
which means not disclosing his disability: 
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 ‘I don’t disclose anymore…. It’s just that people and employers get funny about 
mental illness because it’s not something they can see’  
Researchers note that non-disclosure of a disability in the workforce is a common 
occurrence amongst people with a disability in their efforts to avoid being stigmatized 
(See Russell & Malotra 2002). Moreover, the capacity to do things without assistance 
or modifications in the workplace, has been challenged by disability theorists and 
activists. Rather than collapse autonomy and independence, autonomy is understood 
as the right to make choices and to have equal access to social resources (Galvin, 
2004). Autonomy is also concerned with the right to name and frame social needs and 
the means of having needs met. The assumption that people need motivational 
training in order to acquire a paid job is one of the limiting and ultimately 
disrespectful dimensions of welfare-to-work policies challenged by participants in the 
study.  
The ‘motivation model’ 
Welfare-to-work reforms are premised on the assumption that policy tools must be 
actively deployed to motivate particular groups of recipients to find work and act 
responsibly in their work. This is what Moss and Marston (2009) call the ‘motivation 
model’ and which assumes that one of the main barriers to people with a disability 
finding work is their own lack of motivation, which can be corrected by cutting levels 
of benefits or enacting sanctions. One of the main findings of this study is that 
participants were being treated as though they were unwilling to work. As Bernard 
states: 
‘The thing about these welfare policies is that the government is out there 
broadcasting that: “These people have got to be compelled to work”. What’s that got 
to be telling employers about us? That we are a useless bunch of people that can’t get 
off their arse to work. There are assumptions here that we are capable of working but 
we’re just lazy. There are also assumptions that it’s easy to go out there and find a 
job and that we have the same capacity as anyone else in the community…’  
Similar to other studies, motivation is not the main factor hindering participants’ 
access to employment (See Barnes & Mercer 2005). Many participants are prepared 
to take risks and pursue retraining options or new areas of possible employment. Take  
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36 year-old Nathan who lives with cerebral palsy. He spends a significant proportion 
of his disposable income in transport costs getting him to and from work: 
 ‘I worked for McDonalds for 3 years earning $60 a day and it cost me about $70 a 
day to get there’. But the purpose of doing that was to get work experience and I 
didn’t want to disappoint the employer’. 
Underlying the ‘motivation model’ is also the assumption that one’s actions are self-
determined and that these actions will inevitably lead to tangible benefits in the end, 
including paid employment. But many participants have been trying to get work for 
years. And for some, the pursuit of becoming a financially self-productive individual 
can come at a cost. Jacinta believes that finding work will be the answer to many of 
her problems: 
‘I feel my life is out of control because I want to get a job but no-one’s willing to give 
me a chance and everything else is dependent on me getting work. I think my family 
relationships will improve once I’ve got a job.  I think my circumstances will improve 
because I’ll be able to go out and have a bit more of a social life. I’ll have the money 
then’.  
Against these powerful discourses and strategies of motivating welfare recipients to 
becoming more ‘productive citizens’, most participants struggled to reconcile these 
discourses with their own experiences of structural inequality in the workforce. 
Participants found it very difficult to make ends meet and noted that they were keen to 
put themselves in a financially sustainable position through paid work. One of the 
strongest motivations to get a job was a recognition of the non-cash benefits of having 
a job. Access to social networks was identified as a strong motivation for participants.  
Reforming the disability welfare sector – speaking back 
Contrary to welfare policy which shifts responsibility onto individuals and then 
penalizes them when they fail to find work, participant’s interviews reveal that 
welfare policy should be guided by ideals other than, or at least less determined by, 
personal responsibility for employment status. While there is always a degree of 
personal responsibility that characterizes any social problem, there are many 
structural barriers that must be addressed by the state and employers if open 
employment is going to become a meaningful transition for people with a disability.  
And it is important not to understate the degree to which participants challenge the 
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hegemonic values and social relations operating in their own lives as they navigate the 
welfare-to-work policies. Participants reveal such clarity in how the welfare system 
could be improved. 36 year-old Krystal with cerebral palsy speaks for most research 
participants when she says: 
 ‘There are people that don’t want to work or can’t work. But there are loads of 
people with disabilities who do want to work and many structural barriers prevent 
that from happening. That has to change. If the government was real about wanting to 
get people into the workforce, then they’ve also got to look at the amount of carers 
there are and by carers I don’t mean family members. I mean paid support to help 
people get out of bed in the morning and get to work if that’s what they want.  Help 
people get workplace modifications and help businesses understand the needs for 
people with disability. It’s not about being punitive and punishing an individual, it’s 
about looking at what it takes to enable a person to actively participate in the 
workplace.  It’s not about making sure there are extra provisions; it’s about leveling 
the playing field. And it’s definitely not about coming up with a magical number, 
whether it be 15 hours or 30 hours or whatever. It’s about looking at each individual 
and supporting their capacity to work. 
Further, Jacinta suggests the following in terms of continuity of care and assistance: 
‘…I don’t think we need to be regularly assessed and then just to be shunted off from 
one employment agency to another when you should have some sort of continuity. It’s 
that simple’. 
Bernard has a simple solution for the lack of security that the welfare-to-work policies 
create: 
‘…people need reassurance that if something goes wrong; if their health deteriorates, 
if they lose their job, whatever, that they can go straight back on to DSP without any 
penalty…if you provide people with that security then people may be willing to take 
more risks and go for it’. 
Bernard’s comments recognize that risk and security are two sides of the same coin. 
In order for people to take risks voluntarily they need economic security if things do 
not go as expected. In contrast, the welfare-to-work policies punish failure and are 
generally unforgiving when it comes to allowing individuals to choose a different 
path to autonomy.  
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And finally, James reminds us that work should not be a precondition of social 
citizenship and nor can paid work provide all the conditions for living a flourishing 
life: 
  ‘The final thing to say from me is that, “Full-time paid employment is not the only 
thing in life.” Somebody getting out there and doing volunteer work is great – playing 
music, painting, looking after kids, just hanging out – if that gives meaning in life then 
good on them.  I think there’s a lot of people without a real lot of meaning in their 
lives. Work is not always the answer to this’. 
In these accounts we see how those subject to welfare reform accept some the ends of 
welfare-to-work policies, such as paid employment, but they refuse to accept the 
paternalistic means to achieving this goal, as well as the narrow work-centric 
identities ascribed to them. These accounts reveal how relations of domination and 
subordination are always conditional achievements. This is not a simple replacement 
or displacement of one form of citizenship for another (Clarke, 2006). Participants see 
themselves as having value and a right to support and services that are individually 
tailored to their particular capacities. What is perhaps most concerning from the point 
of view of autonomy is that some of the participants experience the administrative and 
service delivery processes as de-individualising, as failing to recognize their inherent 
capabilities and internal motivation.  
Conclusion 
Participant’s accounts in this paper clearly illuminate the cracks in the neo-liberal and 
neo-paternal welfare-to-work project, which also reveals that producing subjects is an 
unpredictable process. However, to talk about whether welfare recipients ‘internalize’ 
or ‘buy into’ the neoliberal welfare-to-work policies is not enough. Neoliberal 
governance enacts market rationalities, not primarily by imparting skills to welfare 
recipients, but by restructuring the terrain that certain citizens must navigate and 
negotiate in order to be successful under the current system. The overarching 
assumption guiding contemporary welfare-to-work changes is that, by meeting all the 
paternalist requirements – attending the right training, being assessed and reassessed, 
becoming motivated, doing the administrative tasks - recipients will learn the habits 
associated with labour market participation (Schram et al. 2010). Participants’ 
interviews reveal however, that by simply fulfilling the welfare-to-work requirements 
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they are doing what they need to do to fulfill program requirements. Few participants 
saw that the continuous flow of required ‘activities’ as meaningful steps to achieving 
open employment. They saw it as a ‘performance’ required to fulfill their contractual 
obligations. And yet, despite their ambivalence towards these activities, most 
participants did them, sometimes reluctantly, to avoid sanctions and ensure their own 
material security through ongoing state income support.  
To policy makers (and perhaps the public as well) this form of processing may signify 
that welfare-to-work programs are teaching welfare recipients how to work and 
achieve ‘productive citizenship’, but for participants it is something closer to an 
empty gesture and in some cases a cultural insult because most participants are highly 
motivated to work. Schram et al. (2010) argues that the logic of neoliberal paternalism 
is one that is a disciplinary system that aspires to be pedagogical and pastoral, with 
the threat of sovereign power is always present in the form of financial sanctions. 
Certainly the image of instructing welfare recipients to exercise personal 
responsibility via ‘self-disciplinary’ and ‘motivational’ practices has been important 
to the political success of welfare-to-work policy measures. However, the findings we 
have presented should make us cautious about realizing the original intention of the 
welfare-to-work polices in regard to people with disability. We must remember that 
the 2006 Australian reforms were introduced when there was a high demand for 
labour, and yet the numbers of people on DSP did not substantially decrease. 
Although governments may try to diminish the number of persons who need to 
present egitimate claims for state assistance, it is hard to imagine a society where no 
working-age people will need society’s support and exemption from work. What is 
urgently required are policy settings that respond respectfully to the diversity of 
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